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Final EXamination 
CIVIL PRO CEDURE I ( B) Professor Collins 
Fall 1971 
The follO\Jing exami n ation consists of four questions Hith a total of 
360 points. You should allocate your time at app rox imately onehalf minute 
per point. All questions <).re to be assumed factually complete ; hm-lever, 
you may aSSume additional facts if they are necessary. Questions should be 
ans\.)'ered f ully, with respOUSes ~o all leeal issues fairly raised. In addition 
to consideration of analysis of legal issues, organization and writing s tyle 
will have a bearing up on evaluation of the examination. 
Good Luck! 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * '* * * * * * * * '* * .'t * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
1. (180 points) 
On June 17, 1971 , Whitman Corporation, a conglomerate corporation head-
quartered in Ne\v Bruns,vick. New Jersey, brought an action in the northern 
district of New Jersey a £ainst the Tenneson Company, upon pleading, stating 
(after setting forth jurisdiction requirements): 
(1) Tenneson Company sold on or about January 19, 1971 
certain machinery to Hhi tman Corporation, which was 
never operative, and in so doing, breached implied and 
stated warranties . 
(2) The Tenneson Company was specifically damaged in the 
amount of $250,000. 
The defendant, Tenneson, first requested that the Judge disqualify . 
himself, asserting he and his family held substantial blocks of stock in a 
company mii tman \vas to acquire (an assertion in fact not true). The Jude;e 
denied the motion, cited Tenneson's attorney for conte~pt and fined him 
$1,000, admonishing him to display higher professional standards. 
Frustrated, but undaunted, Tenneson ' s counsel sought a change of venue 
of the southern district of Indiana, where Tenneson's manufacturing facilities 
\'lere located. Hi th an affidavit in support of the motion, he pointed out that 
all the personnel, facilities and production \vere located in Columbus, Indiana 
in the southern district of Indiana, that Hhitman's employees had come there 
to inspect the equipment, that the a greement ,vas reached there and that the 
equipment \'laS in fact used in Horth Carolina, at a vJhitman plant, not in 
New Jersey. They also sought a hearing on the motion. The judge summarily 
dismissed the motion \'li thout hearing. 
Next, Tenneson sought to have the action dismissed as not stating a 
cause of action , or any alternative for a definite statement of facts and 
of the damages sought. The judge denied both motions . 
Before trial, the judge noted the complex nature of the machinery and 
referred to a Haster the determination of whether or not they ~vere operative 
over the objection of Hhitman. 
After pre-trial, the sole issue in the order presented was the question 
of warranty coverage. This \vas ordered over Tenneson' s objection that the 
iSsue should include possible negligent insulation or operation by \vorkmen. 
At trial, the Naster ' s r eport was admitted, showing the machines in-
operative . The plaintiff's \Jitness i ntroduced ' testimony as to the condition 
of the machinery, and also established t hat Tenneson had knowingly permitt8d 
the foreman of the crew which manufactured the machinery and two memhers of 
the crew who vTere intoxicated to assemble the equipment that they vlere incapable 
of performing their jobs. Tenneson' s objection to this testimony uas denied. 
Whitman also established damages of $310)000 and an implied agreement that 
there should be repair to the defective machinery by Tenneson. Tenneson then 
established that the specific warranties were not violated and excluded all 
implied warranties. 
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, ,The case V.?s submi tted to the judGe . T·Jhitman's attorney requested a 
ilndlng of negll b e nce of Tenneson, b ased on the lack of supervision of employees. 
damages of $310 . 000, a finding of a duty for repair of the equipment and an 
order for the specific promise of r epairs . Tenneson took objection to the 
proposed findings. The judge adopted them as his holding of the case. Assum-
ing you ~re the party involved , and wish to have appellant revieh1 of each ruling 
agains t 1. t : 
(1) Hhat is the mos t exp edi tious means of obtaining revie~." 
if any, in each situation? Discuss all affinitives and 
justify your conclusions . 
(2) How would the Court of Appeals rule on the meri ts if an 
appeal was entertained? ~fuy? What would have been the 
District Court Judge's proper course of conduct? 
Please discuss each ruling separately in full in relation to both (1) and (2) 
in one paragraph. 
2. (60 points) 
On February 17, 1971, Dorffner struck Nooney's automobile at an inter-
section through which 1100ney vias proceeding at a green light. The city had 
recently installed a computerized traffic control system. Dorffner insisted 
that he also had a green light , although the City Traffic Controller asseri",ed 
that this was impossible in deposi tions to both parties. 
Discovery by Nooney developed the fact that Dorffner had, on two occasions, 
been seen to collapse in his yard by his neighbors. Counterwise, Dorffner 
employed t,V'o experts on computer technology as an adjunct to traffic control, 
with the view of possible use at trial. 
Mooney seeks (1) an admission from Dorffner that he had suffered from 
blackouts and kne~y he might, at any time, have suffered from such a blackout, 
(2) an examination of Dorffner by a specialist in each of the following fields : 
(a) Internal Hedicine, (b) Ophthalmology , (c) Neurology; and (d) Psychiatry ; 
and (3) ans,.,er to interrogatory to Dorffner' s experts concerning the factual 
evaluation of the city's computerized control system and their conclusions 
and opinions concerning it. Dorffner resists each request. 
(1) Hhat ruling on each request? If there is any factual 
information needed to determine the ruling, indicate 
it and the effect it will have upon the ruling. 
(2) \fuat ought the Courc do if Dorffner and his attorney 
continue to resist if he is ordered to comply with 
the foregoing requests? 
3. (60 points) 
On January, 1970 the County Board of l1errimac County, North Carolina, 
rezoned an area for heavy industry. In the area waS located adjacent to an 
ambitious five thousand lot housing development knmvn as Herrimac Haven, uhich 
had been a limited success , having 1200 ' lots occupied by permanent houses, 
about one half of which were used in vacation p eriods only. Several miles to 
the south was located a thriving unincorporated resort area of He rrimac Beach, 
which had a permanent population of over 10,000, and a resort season popUlation 
many times that number. The American International Aluminum Company, a " 
Delaware Corporation, had an option to purchase the land rezoned and announced 
an intention to build an aluminum reduction plant of ultra-modern nature on 
the land. The total cost WaS to be $138 , 000,000 with 1300 employees , all of 
.,hom would be sufficiently compensated to reside in Herrimac Haven. The 
Herrimac Haven Citizens for a Better Environment protested, asked the County 
Board for rezoning, and asked the American International to refrain from 
undertaking this project. The County Board met and refused to reconsider. 
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After pro longed conversations, Amer i c an International a nd ne rd_mac ll<.lveu Ci ti 7.c ns 
for a Better Ertvi ronmen t a g reed that (a) l'Ie rrimac Eaven Citi zens for a Better 
Environment ,",ould not bring suit agains t American International and (b) that 
American Inte rnationa l to]Ould ins tall the bes t possible pollution control 
devices, b e lieved to be those manj fa:::tured by the Corporation for Human 
Development , Inc., of East Houston, Texas (c) to eliminate pollution level by 
particulate count at no more tha n fifty percent of the federal or state 
standard , whichever Has the more strenuous. 
By September of 1.971, American Internat i onal Aluminum Company had built 
Phase I of its works, a $22,535,000 facility, using Corporation for Human 
Development pollution control equipment . Phase I immediately began discharging 
particles at least 200 percent of the federal requirement and 300 percent of 
the state standard. 
Herrimac Haven Citizens for a Better Environment sought: (1) a temporary 
restraining order for American International to cease operations ; (b) a per-
manent injunction, and (c) damages of $i- ,200,000 itemized as $1,000 decline per 
house, or the alternative $3,600,000 in money damages if the plant continued 
operation as decline in value of each house and $7,200,000 in punitive damages. 
American International Aluminum resisted and attempted to implead Citizens 
for Human Development, ,.,hich resisted, asserting that the equipment was 
negligently installed by Stoppingall Construction Co •• Inc., (now bankrupt) 
and they were negligentlY operated by the American International Aluminum 
Co. and that therefore Corporation for Human Development was not liable. 
How should the court rule on:' "" 
(1) The request for temporary restraining order. Consider 
the possible modifications that might be granted. 
(2) The impleader. quest.ion. 
(3) Of the remedies sought by Herrimac Haven Citizens for 
a Better Environment, which is superior; how might they 
be elaborated to be made more effective? 
(4) Discuss the appropriate limits of judicial action in 
this case. 
(5) On what issues may "American International Aluminum get 
a jury trial if the temporary restraining order is 
granted and a permanent injunction is sought? What 
effect will this have on issues in the determination 
of the permanent injunction? 
4. (60 points) 
Brecht Harble Company of NeVl Jersey had a contract with ~-1instead Con-
struction Company of Richmond, sub-contractor of Heyers Bellows, Inc. of 
Raleigh, North Carolina to supply marble for a new City E:al1 in Roanoke, 
Virginia. Erech t sues for failure to pay for marble and labor asking $112,000 
in damages, and naming lUns tead, rfeyers, the City of Roanoke and Heyers' s 
Surity, Allgood Insurance, as defendants. Beyers counterclaims agains t 
Brecht for overpayment of $27,000 to Brecht. 
Winstead then crossclaimed against: Beyers, the City of Roanoke , and 
Allgood Insurance for breach of contract , to ,.,i t non-payment of " $135 ,000 
due and on a second count cross claimed against I1eyers only for $250,000 in 
special and punitive damages, alleging that Meyers failed to prepare the site 
for insulation to Brecht's marble, that Heyers forced Hinstead to \\Tork in 
inclement weather contrary to the contract:, and that Heyers vlrongfully term-
inated his contract with ~·Jinstead. ~-linstead also sought to sue the architect, 
Simpson Bros., in a third-party action, alleging improper supervision of Heyers 
and forcing Winstead to prepare the building for marble insulation in inclement 
'-leather and under possible conditions, seeking from Simpson all funds Winstead 
seeks from 11eyers. 
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Heyers crossclaimed against Uinstead for faulty \vorks and c::\using a delay [or-
$13,000 and f o r indemnity for any li abi lity to Brecht. 
(1) lijlich actions should be joined under the federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure? 
(2) Hm" can the judge handle the um"heely situation, assuning all 
or most of the claims, are joined? 
